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Introduction
In a “typical” American election the partisan split is around 1-5 percent.1
However, the presidential elections of 1964 and 1972 show an unprecedented shift in
partisanship from an overwhelming majority voting Democrat in 1964 to a similar
majority voting Republican in 1972. This paper will argue that a combination of race,
gender and the number of American casualties in the Vietnam War were some of the
causes of the partisan shift. Through the use of political polling and public opinion this
paper will demonstrate that there is a significant shift in the party for which citizens voted
for in these two elections. This is an issue of concern for all Americans. These unusual
elections with tremendous partisan shifts are indicative of a long term shift in the general
political thinking of the voters. Because the United States is a hegemonic power, this shift
toward a more conservative voter baser, culminating with the election of President
Reagan in 1984 has a global impact.
This paper has three main chapters and a conclusion. The first chapter addresses
how Americans’ reactions to the civil rights movement and the riots that came along with
it contributed to the partisan shift from a Democratic majority in the 1964 election to the
Republican majority in the 1972 election. Specifically, I examine how the race riots and
civil rights movement of the 1960s impacted voter registration, turnout, and ultimately
partisan alignment. The chapter will conclude that black voters will be loyal to whichever
party is most likely to support equality and promote rights for blacks. Although the shift
of black voters fro voting Democrat in 1964 to the percentage that switched to vote
1

Scammon, Richard M., and Alice V. McGillivary, eds. America Votes. 1976 ed. Vol. 12.
Washington, D.C.: Elections Research Center, 1977.
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Republican in 1972 is the smallest out of the examined categories, the chapter maintains
that the 7 percent that did shift was influential.
The second chapter examines the role of gender in elections. It will argue that a
large portion of the partisan shift that occurs is due to women. This argument is formed
by taking into account societal role change of women during the Vietnam War as well as
through voter turnout statistics. The chapter concludes that women and men alike are
slowly moving away from the Democratic Party. It also concludes that women, although
they do not make the difference, have a significant impact in the partisan shift between
Democrats and Republicans in the 1964 and 1972 elections.
The final chapter addresses the direct impact that public reaction to the United
States casualty count in the Vietnam War had on party identification. This chapter will
demonstrate the counterintuitive fact that voter turnout continues to decline in times of
international conflict. In relation to the decline of voters there is a shift away from strong
party identification.
Lastly, the conclusion addresses the implications of the partisan shift in current
politics by exploring theories of watershed elections. While some scholars have said that
these elections were not indicative of a party realignment, using the criteria that Angus
Campbell has provided the 1964 and 1972 election are realignment elections.2 Given
what has already been said this paper will examine how these elections can be seen as an
overall shift toward a more conservative country. It will further conclude each of these

2
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factors by themselves cannot significantly change the outcome in any election, but
combined, the potential is tremendous.
Background
This paper studies the variation in partisan voting during two anomaly elections.
In order to prove that these elections varied significantly from normal elections, “normal”
must first be defined. In the scope of this paper a normal election is one whose difference
between the percent votes received by the Democrats and Republicans is less than a ten
percent. Examples of normal elections include the 1968, 1976, and 1982. The mere fact
that the 1968 election only had a .7 percent margin of victory for the Republican Party
during the middle of the Vietnam War suggests that there must be other significant
factors that impacted the partisan shift. 3
In an average election, about five to ten percent of registered Republicans or
Democrats will vote the opposite party.4 In the 1964 election a drastic 20 percent of
Republicans voted for the Democratic candidate, Johnson. Also abnormal, 13 percent of
Democrats voted for a Republican in 1964.5 In contrast 33 percent of registered
Democrats voted for Nixon, the Republican candidate in 1972.6 These statistics prove
that many Americans, during atypical elections, do not remain loyal to their party
affiliation.
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The chart below examines the party affiliation of voters between the two major
parties by year. It is therefore inferred that the remaining voters identify themselves as
independent. The chart shows that historically, an overwhelming majority identify
themselves as Democrats. This in itself proves that many Democrats do not vote their
party identification. Further, the fact that in the elections being focused on (1964 and
1972) have 25 and 37 percent respectively identifying as Independents means that
Independents have the ability to have a large impact in these elections.

7

Due to the large number of Independents, it is important to take into consideration
how independents typically vote. The second graph depicts a breakdown of independent
7

"Party Identification, 1952-80," chart, University of Michigan CPS, in Political Parties in
American Society, by Samuel J. Eldersveld (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1982), 389.
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voting by year up through 1968. Out of the eight elections that were studied for the graph,
the majority of Independents voted Democrat four years and Republican the other four.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the Independent vote is constantly up for grabs.

8

Lastly, the third graph shows voter loyalty to the parties they identify with. This graph
shows which groups ultimately end up voting against their party affiliation in particular
elections.
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Research Center, in American Public Opinion: Its Origins, Content, and Impact, by Robert S. Erikson
and Norman R. Luttbeg (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1973), 12.

7

9

Another factor that must be discussed is voter turnout. While one’s intuition
would rationalize an increase in political interest and therefore an increase in voter
turnout during times of international conflict the statistics prove otherwise. From 1960-
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1976 (roughly the span of the Vietnam War) the average voter turnout of eligible voters
was about 60 percent with a sharp decline to the mid/lower 50s in the 1972 and 1976
elections.10 One factor in the drastic decline was the 26th amendment.
The 26th amendment to the United States constitution, which changed the voting
age to 18, was ratified at the end of 1971. By decreasing the voting age an entire new
population of young men and women were able to cast ballots in the 1972 presidential
election. In theory, this should have increased voter registration and turnout in the 1972
election. Instead, this became one of the largest declines in the percentage of voter
turnout.
While the average increase in the voting age population between presidential
elections is around 11 million, the increase between the 1968 and 1972 elections was
over 20 million. The voter registration only increased by 15 million and the percent of the
voting-age population that voted was a meager 55.2 percent instead of the previous
average of 60 percent. It is possible to conclude that the new, younger voting population
is to blame for this sharp decline. Since the ratification of the 26th amendment there has
been a continuous decline in the percent turnout of the voting-age population.11
While voters’ reactions to shifts in perceptions of race, gender, and the Vietnam
War will be the focus of this paper there are more factors that must be examined. Some of
these include type of work, education level, and political scandals during a campaign.
Occupation played a role in the partisan shift of 1964 and 1972. In polling data,
occupations are divided into three categories; professional and business, white collar, and

10

"National Voter Turnout in Federal Elections: 1960-2008," Information Please,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0781453.html (accessed October 13, 2010).
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Ibid.
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manual. In the 1960 election 40 percent of both professionals and white collar workers
voted for the Democratic candidate and about 50 percent for the Republican candidate.
Manual workers voted 60 percent for the Democrat and 40 percent for the Republican.12
However, in 1964, the professionals and white collar workers voted in the 50 percent for
the Democrat candidate and in the low 40 percentage for the Republican. The manual
workers had an 11 percent increase in their votes for the Democrat. This same shift is
evident in the 1968 and 1972 elections except the shift went in favor of the Republican
candidate.13
Education is a key factor in any voter turnout study. Polling data indicates that the
higher the level of education a person has, the more likely they are to vote and be
informed voters. However, few studies examine how education level affects party votes.
In a normal election (as defined above) about 60 percent of college graduates vote
Republican and 40 percent vote Democrat, high school graduates typically split 50-50,
and grade school graduates usually vote 60 percent Democrat and 40 percent
Republican.14 With this knowledge, this paper seeks to use public opinion polls to
demonstrate that factors greater than education, occupation, and political scandals have
the ability to create a significant shift in party identification.
Although the Watergate scandal happened before President Nixon was reelected
in 1972, the story didn’t come out until 1973. This delay gave Nixon time to appoint a

12
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Republican vice president before he was forced to resign.15 However, in the first
presidential election following the scandal the country elected a Democrat. This is
indicative of a pattern that has occurred throughout history. After Bill Clinton’s scandal
was revealed the country continued this pattern and voted not necessarily for the
Republican Party, but against the Democratic Party.
Each of these factors come together to contribute to any type of partisan shift no
matter how large or small or from which party to which. Although the statistical
information points out that certain factors weigh more heavily in certain electoral
outcomes, none of these factors is strong enough to be the sole cause of any party’s
victory.

15
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Race and the Partisan Shift
The Vietnam War may have attracted the most controversy internationally during
the 1960s but beyond the anti-war protests inside the United States an unprecedented
movement was taking place: the civil rights movement of the 1960s. This chapter argues
that Americans’ reaction to the civil rights movement and the riots that came along with
it contributed to the partisan shift from a significant Democrat majority in the 1964
presidential election to an almost landslide victory for the Republican Party in 1972. The
increase in black voter registration and turnout through this time allowed for a greater
political voice among the black community. However, even with the increase in black
voter turnout, the white majority was still able to outvote and therefore have a greater
impact in the presidential elections of 1964 and 1972. The civil rights movement during
the 1960s paved the way for future political activism in the black community but has not
had a dramatic impact in any electoral turnout.
This chapter will begin with a brief background to the civil rights movement and
the riots that occurred in the 1960s. Following this is historical data on the voting pattern
of blacks which demonstrates that blacks are loyal to the party that best benefits the
advancement of their societal standing and equality. Culminating all of this is the analysis
of how these factors along with others such as education caused black voters to shift from
an overwhelming majority voting Democrat in 1964 to only a majority voting Democrat
in 1972.

12

The civil rights movement first reached the attention of large numbers of
Americans in 1955 when Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat on a bus in Alabama.16
This demonstration was followed by further discrimination which led to non violent sitins, demonstrations and eventually racial violence. As the movement for racial equality
progressed riots began to break out around the country in many cities. The first riot was
the Watts riot in Los Angeles that took place in 1965. This riot was followed by equally
severe uprisings in Newark in 1966 where the National Guard had to be called in and the
Detroit riot in 1967 where federal troops had to be used. The largest of these riots was the
Chicago riot that took place on April 5, 1968 in direct response to the assassination of
civil rights leader Martin Luther King. Following his death, 95 riots sprang up across the
nation in the following year.17 Although these were the major uprisings of the time the
movement inspired unrest in over 127 cities across the nation.18
Prior to the riots, in the summer of 1964 hundreds of volunteers from various
organizations came together in Mississippi to launch a voter registration drive. The drive
was intended to help southern blacks gain equality and allow them to have a political
impact. It registered thousands of new voters by teaching the importance of voting.19 Up
until this time African Americans in the south had been deterred from voting by rigged
tests of eligibility and threat of violent reprisals. Further, there was no way to monitor
poll taxes and therefore blacks were often taxed a rate so high that they could not afford
to vote. The voter registration drive in Mississippi produced a voter turnout increase
16

Michael Clodfelter, Warfare and Armed Conflicts: a Statistical Reference to Casualty and Other
Figures, 1500-2000, 2nd ed. (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., Publishers, 2002), 703.
17
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throughout the state of 110,975 people.20 Throughout the South, voter registration drives
such as this, increased the overall African American registered voters by about half a
million.21 Although black voter turnout increased dramatically in 1964, nearly all voting
for Democratic candidates, white voters still outnumbered blacks substantially and most
Mississippians voted Republican. This indicates that the sharp increase in voter turnout in
Mississippi was due, in part, to a surge of white voters trying to suppress the black
minority.
Throughout the nation 94 percent of nonwhite voters supported Democratic
presidential candidate or voted to reelect Democratic president Lyndon Johnson in the
1964 election.22 It has been agreed upon by historians that the 1964 election was one of
the most racially polarized elections in recent history. Ironically, scholars also believe
that race alone was not the deciding factor.23 This overwhelming support for the
Democratic candidate was a relatively new concept for African American voters at the
time. Blacks, like women, had a conservative voting history. African Americans strongly
supported the Republican Party up until 1936 Republican Party had brought blacks
Emancipation and the brief period of reconstruction. Blacks then strongly supported the
New Deal presidential coalition until 1956 when they voted Republican at a higher level
than anytime since 1932.

20
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By 1960 the civil rights movement had gained speed and the
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Ibid., 4.

14

black vote was anybody’s guess. As Gallup polls demonstrate, a very heavy majority 68
percent of nonwhites voted Democrat in the 1960 election.25 This dramatic shift only
intensified into the 1964 election when African Americans shifted their party affiliation
and loyalty to the Democratic Party. This shift toward the Democrat party can be
explained partially by the way presidential candidates treated the civil rights movement
and also by societal factors. Johnson campaigned for racial equality. He repeatedly
pledged to pass laws that supported equal rights. Goldwater’s solution, on the other hand,
was to focus on the southern white vote and claim that it was up to the state to determine
future racial laws.26 He claimed that each state knew what it needed best and that
integration was not a legal issue but instead an issue of the heart and therefore it was not
the duty of the federal government to pass integration laws.27 Being that this presidential
election was racially charged, it was detrimental that Barry Goldwater was unable to
persuade black voters that he was a viable presidential candidate.
From the 1964 to the 1972 presidential elections nonwhite voters shifted from 6
percent voting Republican to 13 percent voting Republican.28 This 7 percent change is
only average in size throughout the historical changing opinion of black voters. One
reason for this average shift is the lack of attention that was being given to the civil rights
movement at this time. Nixon had since become accustom to the riots and was now doing
what he could to calm the south while still carrying on with Vietnam. This shift of
25

Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/9454/election-polls-vote-groups-19601964.aspx (accessed
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African American voters from traditional Republican voting to a more recent Democratic
majority is demonstrated in the chart below. The shift that takes place is demonstrative of
how blacks have drastically changed their party affiliation and voting tendencies since
1952.

29

Voter registration among African Americans has always been a topic of concern
for civil rights activists. A main reason for this was that in 1952 only 4 percent of eligible

29

"Race and Presidential Voting, 1952-1968," chart, Gallup Poll, in American Public Opinion: Its
Origins, Content, and Impact, by Robert S Erikson and Norman R Luttbeg (New York: John Wiley &
Sons, Inc., 1973), 188.
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southern African Americans were registered to vote.30 Government programs and
registration drives throughout the country dramatically increased that number to 63
percent by 1968. Strikingly, this statistic was only true in the south. Northern African
Americans had a 64 percent registration rate even in 1952 and 83 percent of the non
southern African Americans turned out to vote in 1964. This large influx in voter turnout
among blacks in the north was only part of the Democratic victory. Not only did the 1964
election have a high number of African Americans turn out to vote but a large portion of
the voting population that did turn out to vote were young African Americans. The
younger generation that turned out to vote was the same group that was putting together
demonstrations. The activism for societal equality went beyond education and job
opportunities. This young group also protested for political equality which included equal
voting rights. The level of young African Americans who turned out for the 1964 election
has not since been reached in another election until 2008.31
In 1964 about 70 percent of the white voting population turned out to vote while a
record high 58 percent of blacks showed up to vote. Due to the surge of white voters in
1964 as a result of the black voter registration drives, it is logical to think that the surge
would continue in 1968. This is partially true in that the percentage of white voter
registration increased from 61.1 percent in 1960 to 76.5 percent in 1967.32 However,

30

M. Margaret Conway, Political Participation in the United States (Washington, D.C.:
Congressional Quarterly Inc, 2000), 32.
31

U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/tabA-9.csv (accessed November
11, 2010).
32
Paul Kleppner, Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870-1980 (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1982), 116.
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white voter turnout continued to decrease as did black voter turnout with black voter
turnout decreasing at a slower rate.33 The graph below shows the steady decline in both
voter registration and voter turnout by race in presidential and midterm elections from
1966 to 1996.

33

U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Census Bureau,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/socdemo/voting/publications/historical/tabA-9.csv (accessed November
11, 2010).
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Measuring African American turnout in absolute terms leads to an unrealistic
comparison to other ethnicities. Studies have shown that people who are better educated
and have a higher income turn out to vote in higher numbers and with greater regularity.
The better educated voters with a higher income tend to be white. Therefore, it is
imperative that these differences be taken into consideration when talking about the
impact that race has in voter turnout and ultimately in presidential elections. Paul
Kleppner has looked into these differences in his book Who Voted? The Dynamics of
Electoral Turnout, 1870-1980. By accounting for these differences Kleppner was able to
find a realistic comparison between the two ethnicities. This comparison shows what
voting would be like between whites and blacks if all societal factors were equal.
The graph below demonstrates how the adjustment of the factors previously
mentioned can be taken into account and then compared to the average white voter. The
negative sign indicates that even with the adjustments white voters had a higher voter
turnout. The difference attributed to race begins to shrink in 1962 and continues to shrink
until disappears in the north in 1964 and in the south in 1968.
The 1972 election provides an interesting situation for African American voters.
In 1972, 33 percent of registered Democrats voted for Nixon (the Republican candidate).
Of this 33 percent, the black population made up about 13 percent. This is a 6 percent

34
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increase from the 7 percent of blacks who voted Republican in 1964.35 A major cause for
this shift was the slowing of the civil rights movement. The riots had come to a stop and
the movement had died down. There was a new found sense of equality and the issues at
hand for black voters had changed slightly. The slight shift explains why the
overwhelming majority remained loyal to the Democratic Party.

35

Gallup. http://www.gallup.com/poll/9457/election-polls-vote-groups-19681972.aspx (accessed
September 28, 2010).
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It is evident from the above graphs and analysis that although race was not
decisive in determining the outcome of the elections from 1964 to 1972, it played a role
in the outcome of the 1964 and 1972 contests. In 1964 when the civil rights movement
was still very prominent race was a main topic of conversation during the election. By
1972 when the civil rights movement had settled down, other topics of interest took the
forefront. Race played only a moderate role in the 1968 election, despite the race riots, as
Vietnam had taken primary concern.
Although the peak of the civil rights movement is in the distant past there are still
racial issues that factor into presidential elections. Race had become less of a concern for
several years until in 2008 the United States elected its first black president. This has
been monumental for the racial equality movement and has proven how far Americans
have come from segregated schools to electing an African American leader of the free
world. Aside from this accomplishment, many citizens continue to feel that equality has
still not been achieved and until that has occurred race will continue to play a factor in all
elections.

36
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Gender and the Partisan Shift
Throughout history women have been thought of as inferior. Women had a role in
the house as a wife, mother, and housekeeper. They were often not welcome in the
workforce and when they were, their salaries were less than their male counterparts and
there was no such thing as equal treatment in the work place. This chapter seeks to
examine how the changing role of women at home, in society and the Vietnam War
impacted the voting turnout and partisan shift of women. To begin, the chapter will give
background on how women’s role in society and at home changed during the 1960s. It
will then look into historical voting trends of women and how they have changed over
time. Lastly, the chapter will analyze how the Vietnam War has impacting these voting
trends, thus concluding that since the 1960s women have identified better with the
Democratic Party. Although women tend to identify themselves as Democrats, there are
particular instances in which the majority of women voted Republican such as the 1972
election. This also allows one to conclude that women are not as closely tied to party
identification as males. These findings are important to future campaigns. The knowledge
that at least a large percentage of the female vote is flexible allows for politicians to focus
large parts of their campaign on the female vote.
The struggle for political standing was interrelated to the struggle for societal
equality. However, just as African Americans had to fight to gain equality, and
subsequently gained it, so too did women. This fight for equality between men and
women began around 1918 when women’s suffrage became a feasible goal. Although the
struggle continues today, the 1960s were a time for women to step away from their
traditional conservative roles and become politically active.

22

The 60’s were known for the Beatles, drugs, and the countercultural movement.
This was the perfect setting for women to stand up and make a point. Many women were
ready to change everything. They changed their appearances by changing their makeup,
hairstyle, and most obviously, the drastic change in clothes. The shy, conservative,
housewife was no longer the role these women wanted to fulfill.
Even with a striking social shift taking place in the 1960s, it has not been until
recently that scholars and politicians began to study gender roles as a factor in partisan
identification and turn out. This new field began to study the “gender gap” which refers
to the difference in political opinion and voting between men and women. The normal
gender gap on any issue is about five to ten percentage points.37 This means that in
normal elections, men and women should statistically not be the cause of any partisan
shift. The only way a partisan shift can be caused by gender is if either males or females
make a drastic change in their opinion on several issues, thus causing a change in party
identification. However, if men and women tend as a group to vote in the same way on a
particular issue (for instance tough on crime or welfare benefits) then a single issue has
the ability to be the cause of a majority of the population to change party affiliation.
In the 1950s most female voters identified themselves with the Republican
Party.38 There were two specific reasons for this. The first was that many females, both
those who worked and those who stayed at home were not in unions. This was generally
the cause because union jobs were not offered to women. Either way, females were not in
unions and therefore had no desire to affiliate with a party that was very much union
37
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based at the time. The second reason is that women in society thought of themselves and
were seen as tradition housewives who were religious and conservative in both dress and
speech. This stereotype produced a natural alignment with the Republican Party which
tended to have a more religious based policy agenda.
As is expected there are certain issues which evoke a gender gap. The first, and
perhaps the most obvious, is violence. This difference originated in the 1940s with men
being more supportive of the death sentence and women being more favorable to gun
control.39 A Gallup poll done in 1967 revealed that when asked if the person would favor
a law requiring a police permit before buying a gun 83 percent of women said yes while
only 66 percent of men agreed.40 When asked if a person who was convicted of murder
should receive the death penalty, 51 percent of women were opposed while only 36
percent of males were opposed41. This difference in opinion continues in the debate over
international violence. With international violence come casualties and sometimes poorly
planned military operations. These events have a higher rate of leading to the injury or
death of civilians, therefore decreasing women’s approval ratings. Therefore it is no
surprise that when asked if the United States should have stayed out of Vietnam, 69
percent of women and 57 percent of men agreed.42
The second issue that men and women generally disagree on is what is called
compassion issues. This category includes things like welfare and equality laws. The
39
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"Opinion Differences Between Men and Women on Selected Issues," chart, Gallup Opinion
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origin of this gap is directly correlated to transformation of women’s ideologies and the
gaining of equality in society through the 60s and 70s. This gap began to gain recognition
in the early 70s.43 While there are several explanations for the growth of this gap,
scholars tend to agree that the basic reason for this underlying difference is maternal
instinct. Mothers want their children to have equal opportunities throughout life and want
to know that if their children are in a tough economic situation that they will be provided
for by the government. The fathers tend to have a “tough love” approach and believe that
their children will be able to succeed or fail on their own accord.
The National Election Studies (NES) has conducted surveys on voters’ views of
using military force in international conflict. Contrary to the above survey, this NES
survey was used to find the approval rating of wars once they had already started and to
measure how the approval ratings changed throughout the war. The first survey was
conducted in 1952 asking men and women separately how they felt about the United
States being involved in the Korean War. To this question, 57 percent of men and only 42
percent of women thought that United States involvement was the right thing to do.44 The
same survey, with the same wording, was again used during the 1960s and 1970s to
determine men’s and women’s opinions concern both the involvement in Vietnam. While
overall support fell from 61 percent in 1964 to 34 percent in 1972, the gender gap
remained solid with a nine percent difference throughout the war.45 This concludes that
while the gender gap was not the sole factor in the partisan shift between the two

43
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elections, it was on the brink of being an abnormal split which is anything above ten
percent difference between men and women.
As time passes gender issues tend to shift and along with this is a change in party
identification. From the point when women acquired the right to vote until the beginning
of the countercultural movement women tended to identify more with the Republican
Party. This was due to the conservative nature of women’s roles. During the 1960s and
1970s as women’s roles began to change so did their party affiliation. Women started to
become more liberal in both society and politics. The one issue that they remained
conservative on was religion. Women tend to be more likely to support prayer in school
and drug and alcohol laws.
Although each of the categories mentioned above play a role in the gender gap,
the overarching theme is party identification. NES has been conducting partisan
alignment surveys of both men and women since 1952. The support for the Democratic
Party among men peaked in 1954 and 1964 at 61 percent and declined to 41 percent in
1994. The support among men for the Democratic Party remained in the 40s until the
2008 election where men split down the middle for Democrats and Republicans.46 The
support for the Democratic Party among women also declined. Women’s support peaked
in 1964 with 62 percent, and since declined to 51 percent in 1984. Since 1984 women’s
support for the Democratic Party has remained in the low 50s or upper 40s. The
exception was the 2008 election in which 57 percent of women voter for Obama.47
Although there has been a slight decline in support of the Democratic Party among
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women, the majority continues to stay in favor of Democratic candidates. Meanwhile,
men have consistently decreased their support for Democrats at a rate of about one
percent per election cycle.48
The gender gap in terms of party affiliation is not consistent. Leading up to the
1960s women were far more Republican than men were, but ten percent less of eligible
women voters turned out to vote. Therefore the party gap between the genders was not
statistically significant until 1956. At this point a shift began to occur and men started to
identify with the Republican Party and women became more Democratic in
identification. At this point women began to speak up more about their voting rights and
become more involved with societal issues. In the 1960s as the Vietnam War gained
momentum and the duration became unclear women identified better with the anti-war
party which was usually Democrat. Thus, as women gained status in the working field
during the war many of the women felt they should continue to gain equality in the work
force, therefore reinforcing the most prominent issue for women as social issues. As
noted in the figure below the shifting of parties crossed in 1964 and became statistically
significant in 1972. From 1972 forward the gender gap, in regards to party identification
has remained significant in the majority of elections.49
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An important category that is often over looked is the sway of registered
Independent female voters. As the two charts below demonstrate, there is a significant
difference when independents are forced to take a side in a two party system. The first
chart shows party identification by gender which includes voters who identify themselves
as strong and weak Democrats or Republicans. The second chart shows party preference
which includes voters who are strong, weak, and independents who lean Democrat or
Republican. The difference in the numbers show that 8 percent of female voters who
identified themselves as independent sided with the Democratic Party in 1964 while only
5 percent sided with Republicans. A larger gap is shown in the male independent voters.
11 percent of independent voters when asked which direction they would lean sided with
the Democratic Party and only 7 percent sided with Republicans. This lean in
independent voters, combined between men and women, had the possibility to account
for 19 percent of the votes for Democrats in the 1964 election. This election was a
landslide election and the Democrats won the election by about 23 percent. However, the
independent vote may have counted for a significant part of that landslide.
The 1972 election was a landside for the Republican Party. President Nixon also
won the election by about 23 percent. In the 1972 election 12 percent of male
Independent voters said they leaned Democrat while 13 percent said they leaned
Republican. In the same election 11 percent of Independent female voters said they
would side with the Democratic Party and 9 percent said they would side with
50
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Republicans. Collectively, male and female Independents would make up 23 percent of
Democrats and 22 percent of Republicans. Therefore it can be concluded that gender
within Independent voters did not play a significant factor in the landslide election of
1972 but it did have a significant impact in 1964.
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The elections that are being focused on in this paper are the 1964 election and the
1972 election. This graph shows that in 1964 the opportunity to gain the vote of both
males and females was even. There was no statistical gender gap and therefore gender
should not play a role in the partisan shift. However, Gallup Polls for the 1964 election
indicate that 60 percent of men and 62 percent of women voted for the Democrat
candidate.53 In 1972 the Republican candidate received 63 percent of the male votes and
62 percent of the female votes.54 In 1964 about 60 percent of men and women identified
themselves as Democrats according to the graph above. Therefore it is in line with this
that about 60 percent of each gender voted Democrat. However, in 1972 we begin to see
a shift. As mentioned above, around this time women began to identify more with the
Democratic Party and men began to shift toward the Republican Party. As the graph
above shows, slightly less than 50 percent of men still identified themselves as
Democrats whereas about 55 percent of women did. The surprise is in the turnout of the
presidential election. In 1972 63 percent of men and 62 percent of women voted
Republican. Therefore, approximately thirteen percent of men voted against their party
identification in the 1972 election and almost twenty percent of women voted against
their party identification.
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The table below places a numerical value to the gender gaps that take place in
each election cycle. One surprising factor is that out of four elections where a possible
third candidate was in the running, two of those elections resulted in an extremely large
gender gap in favor of men supporting the third candidate. This table also indicates the
potential power that gender gaps can have in the outcome of an election. There was a
steady increase in the gender gap beginning in the early 1960s, peaking in 1996 and then
slowly shifted back toward a non-existent gender gap until 2008 when it reemerged.
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From this data we can conclude that Nixon, the Republican candidate in 1972,
had to run a campaign that focused both on the economics aspects that Republican men
had started to identify with, and on the moral and civil rights issues that women identified
with. In 1964, with about 60 percent of men and women identifying with the Democratic
Party it is not surprising that the Democrat candidate would receive roughly 60 percent of
the votes from both genders. What is interesting is the shift that took place between the
two elections. This is when the Vietnam War began to pick up. As international conflict
increased so too did the need for the use of military actions. As noted earlier, women
have an overall disapproval of international military use. Thus, it would make sense that
in 1964 women would support a Democrat candidate who was less inclined to use
military action. The 1968 election, although in the middle of the two extremes, is also
unique. With a third candidate in the running, female voters were pulled in three
directions. 12 percent of women who voted in 1968 voted for Wallace, the third
candidate.56 That allowed for this 12 percent to be up for grabs in the 1972 election. It
was, perhaps, this 12 percent that realigned with the Republican Party to create the
partisan shift from 1964 to 1972. However, counterintuitive to the 1964 election is the
striking amount of women who voted Republican in the 1972 election. The approval
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rating among women had declined which would lead to a logical conclusion that women
would vote for a candidate who was less inclined to use further military action and
continue the war. This was not the case. Instead, women voted on more than just one
issues. Taking into account issues such as civil rights and other compassion issues,
women were able to make a decision to support a candidate who was opposite their party
identification.
This chapter therefore concludes that as the role of women became more liberal,
so too did their partisan identification. This identification has become a prominent factor
in presidential elections since the 1970s. The exception to this pattern was the 1972
election in which Nixon ran on the idea of “Vietnamization” which would allow for
Vietnam to start fighting their own war and pull out American troops. This strategy
would mean less international violence which was a large area of concern for women.
Therefore, although the majority of women voters identified themselves as Democrats,
over 60 percent voted Republican. There are now over twenty organizations that seek an
active role in getting women out to vote. Women continue to identify as more liberal than
their male counterparts and have continued to increase not only voter registration but also
actual turnout at the poll.
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American Casualties in Vietnam and the Partisan Shift
There are few things that can change a person’s outlook on life in the way that a
war can. War has the ability to change domestic and global economic situations, change
family structure, and change interactions within a society. This chapter will argue that as
more American soldiers were killed in the Vietnam War, public opinion for the war
decreased which resulted in a partisan shift from a Democratic majority in 1964 to a
Republican majority in 1972. This theory is derived from the concept that as more
American soldiers were killed in Vietnam and as it became more evident that there was
no way to “win” the war, people began to seek any candidate that was against the war
regardless of party. One might also expect Americans to look for a presidential candidate
who wanted either to withdraw troops as soon as possible or to adopt a new, innovative
strategy that would reduce the number of American deaths. That candidate was Richard
Nixon who campaigned on the idea of “Vietnamization” in 1972. Many Americans were
losing brother, husbands, and sons, the longer the war lasted. It was therefore very
important for families that the war was ended as soon as possible and the fruitless loss of
life was stopped.
This chapter will first examine how an issue such as an international war can
transcend traditional party lines therefore allowing for landslide elections. It will then
analyze the change that took place in public opinion as the casualty count of American
troops increased which will conclude that as casualties rise, public support for the war
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declines. To support these public opinion polls, studies are included that have found five
main factors that determine the level of a support for a war. The analysis will then focus
on how demonstrations, rallies, and general public activism were received by the majority
of the population. Lastly, the chapter will conclude by combining these factors to show
that each one contributed to the partisan shift from a Democratic majority in 1964 to a
Republican majority in 1972.
There are certain times in history where all stereotypes are erased and
international concerns are able to transcend traditional party politics. In Paul Kleppner’s
book Who Voted? it is argued that the period between 1960 and 1970 is one of the few
times in history where political party differences become irrelevant.57 As issues such as
war began to transcend traditional party values, voters also began to change customary
voting patterns. Most voters, regardless of party affiliation, had a new found respect for
life as they continuously watched thousands of American soldiers lose their lives without
anything to show for.
A Harris poll taken in 1967 asked a sample group of registered voters if they had
been directly affected by the Vietnam War and what they found most troubling about the
war. Ironically, most people responded to the first question by saying that had not been
directly affected by the war. However, it is strikingly obvious that what people found
most troubling in the war was the loss of lives. The same questions were again asked in
1968, where concern about the number of casualties rose 13 percent.
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The disapproval of the Vietnam War had a lot to do with the international status
of Vietnam. Vietnam has been considered a third world country for several decades and
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continues to be considered as such as recently as 2009 by United Nations statistics.60
Public opinion polls have proven that average Americans are less likely to support the use
of weapons in internationally lower ranking countries.61 The only third would country
that continues to have significant importance among Americans is Mexico and that is
directly correlated to its proximity.
Several studies have been conducted to determine what factors affect
Americans’ public opinion on international intervention. The results show that there are
five deciding factors which determine how much support military action will receive in
third world countries.62
1. distance from the United States
2. economic importance to the United States
3. sociocultural affinity based on economic development
4. type of government
5. presence or absence of a formal military alliance with the United States.
Out of these five factors distance from the United States is by far the most important. In
fact, this one variable alone can be used to determine domestic support. The distance (in
miles) between the United States and the foreign nation is almost directly proportionate
to what support will be. This relationship creates a linear line of declining support. In
relation to this, the economic importance of the country to the United States (based on
total trade) only became a significant factor when nuclear weapons were being used or
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considered.63 With Vietnam being thousands of miles away, having little to zero
economic importance to the United States, the sociocultural affinity being extremely low,
not having a stable government, and lacking a formal military alliance with the United
States, it is easy to understand why public opinion for the war was dismal.
These studies conclude that not only does domestic support decline as the conflict
moves farther away, but social unrest also follows. Unless American citizens view the
conflict as a direct threat to the security and safety of the United States there will be little
to no support given to military intervention at any point. In fact, not only will support be
withheld but protests, strikes, and crime rates in the United States will increase.64
Therefore the only way for the government to get involved in a third world country’s
international conflicts is either with very little military action, thereby requiring only
minimal sacrifice from the public, by providing aid in an indirect manor which keeps the
American public in the dark on the situation, or by quickly providing military
intervention followed by success and a fast withdraw.
As the war in Vietnam progressed, the domestic support of any type of military
action overseas greatly diminished. This trend is reflected in the perceived notion of what
the defense budget should be. According to public opinion, many Americans thought the
defense budget should be lowered until 1974 when public opinion against the war
reached its peak. Beginning in 1976 Americans have increasingly become more
supportive of a larger defense budget. This can be due to several things. The first is the
American people may be favorable to increased military spending in order to avoid
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another disaster such as Vietnam. 65 Or, there may have been a large enough time span
from Vietnam until more recent polling that a new generation of voters, who are likely to
be polled for public opinion, did not experience Vietnam and therefore have no
recollection of the atrocity.
The graph below demonstrates how quickly public support can decline as the
reality of the war becomes evident. In 1965 when the war in Vietnam was still relatively
new 60 percent of Americans polled were supportive of Untied States intervention.
However, this trend quickly drops off as more money and troops are consistently being
sent to Vietnam. The slight ups and downs are indicative of international negotiations and
shifts in international policy. Although the chart ends in 1971 when Gallup stopped
asking if going into Vietnam was a mistake, other research concludes that public support
continued to decline until the end of the war. Therefore, it can be said that while the
above mentioned factors are important in determining the support of a war, another key
factor is the way in which the war is handled. In other words, because there was no
conclusive result or plan for Vietnam, public support diminished. Had there been a clear
motive, with a set plan and goals being achieved, the public may have given the war more
support for a longer time period.
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John E. Mueller from the University of Rochester and Jeffrey Milstein have done
extensive research into the cause of the great decline in the public support of both the
Korean and Vietnam wars. They both found that the most important variable in the
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decline of public support during a war is the casualty rate. This differs from the above
studies in that the above studies analyzed support for initial involvement, Mueller and
Milstein focused primarily on public opinion once the war had already started. As the
casualty rate of American soldiers increased, public support decreased. Mueller was able
to find a systematic decrease in the support of the war. His study of the two wars showed
that every time casualty rates went up by a factor of ten, public support declined by 15
percent.67 Milstein’s study found the correlation to be 0.94. Both of these findings
conclude that there is a direct correlation to the death rate and public support. By
comparing the below graph with the above approval ratings it becomes evident that this
correlation holds true.
Another factor that is rarely taken into account when studying public support of
wars is the desensitization of the public. With nightly coverage of war and death
notifications, the public eventually becomes desensitized to people being killed. Over
time the reporting of more deaths becomes incomprehensible. The general population is
no longer able to relate to that one death and casualties turn into statistics.
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A later study was conducted by Samuel Kernell from the University of California
at San Diego which concluded that it was not just number of United States casualties that
affected the approval ratings of the president but also the number of bombings that were
taking place. Combined these two factors account for 80 percent of the presidential
disapproval rating.68
The relation to disapproval ratings can also be tied into party identification. In
1968 as the disapproval rating was sky rocketing, the Survey Center began linking party
identification with public opinion of Vietnam. In a survey conducted in 1968 it was found
that 83 percent of Democrats, given normal voting at elections, wanted immediate
withdrawal from Vietnam while only 12 percent of Republicans felt immediate
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withdrawal was advantageous.69 Even during a time where a large portion of Democrats
felt immediate withdrawal was necessary (typically a strategy more closely related to a
Democratic candidate) 12 percent of Democrats voted for the Republican in 1968.70
Assuming this sentiment continued, it is surprising that 33 percent of Democrats voted
Republican in the 1972 election.71 Thus proving that public disapproval of the war was
not the only cause in the partisan shift from Democratic to Republican.
This shift indicates that while the majority of the population was unsatisfied with
the war effort, an overwhelming majority were otherwise satisfied with Nixon’s
leadership capabilities. One of the characteristics that allowed for Nixon to create such a
landslide election turnout was his policy of Vietnamization. This policy was based on the
idea that more fighting should be turned over to the South Vietnamese which would
decrease American casualties. This policy is reminiscent of what Johnson had promised
during his 1964 landslide election. The fact that both a Republican and a Democrat used
the same sentiment to win landslide elections is indicative that the Vietnam War was the
single issue which voters were concerned about. Voters were willing to transcend party
identification in order to get troops out of Vietnam.
While approval of the war was plummeting the unrest in the United States was
steadily increasing. It is commonly thought that the majority of citizens took place in
some sort of antiwar protest during Vietnam. This, however, could not be more incorrect.
While there were several groups that actively created and participated in demonstrations
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it was in no way the majority. The overarching goal of any protest is to change public
opinion enough to force the government to act accordingly. Many scholars agree that the
antiwar protestors failed to change the level of public support for immediate withdraw
during the war. A study done by William Berkowitz found that in 15 significant protests
there was zero correlation between the protests and public opinion. Further, most antiwar
protestors were actually viewed negatively by 75 percent of Americans. Lastly,
psychologists have found that it is very possible that the antiwar protests actually
increased support for the war by acting as a “negative reference group”. In other words,
because the majority of Americans disapproved of the protests so much, they actually
began to approve of the war just to spite the protestors.72 The change in approval of the
war may also be indicative of a shift toward Republican voting patterns as Republicans
tend to be more active in international military affairs.
Nixon was able to use the Vietnam War to secure his election in 1968 and win a
near landslide election in 1972. Historical patterns indicate that a majority of the time
during any large international military war the incumbent party is voted out of the white
house the majority of the time.73 Therefore it is normal that many voters would be upset
with the incumbent party and elect a Republican in 1968. What is unusual was the
amount of support Nixon was able to accumulate between 1968 and 1972. He was able to
prove his worth by continuously coming up with new plans for Vietnam that gave the
voting population hope. This landslide election is just one example of how merely giving
Americans hope that the military can still succeed is enough to increase the tolerance for
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casualties. This pattern is again reflected in President Obama’s election in 2008. Many
Americans had lost hope in the war in Iraq and by simply planning a new strategy,
president Obama was able to secure his election.
It is clear from the data that as casualty count increased public opinion of both the
war and the administration decreased. This, however, is not enough to come to a
conclusive decision that the casualties in the Vietnam War were the direct cause of the
partisan shift from Democrat to Republican between the 1964 and 1972 elections. This
was merely one factor in the general movement of the voting population toward the right.
It is fairly well known that wars without domestic support do not end well. If
there is no domestic support then there will be no sacrifices made and now a president
has to worry about both his domestic problems and international issues. Although the
factors included in the above chapter all impact the overall approval rating of a president
and the war efforts, these factors can all be summed up by one phrase: cost-benefit. The
American public takes into account the cost of the war (casualties) and weighs it against
the benefit (success). In the case of the Vietnam War there was no success to show for
and no other benefit for American voters to compare the cost to. Therefore, it was an easy
decision that without any benefit, the war would not be supported. This lack of support
due to casualty count has since been renamed as a casualty phobia. It is the fear that
becoming militarily involved in another country will lead to too many casualties without
a result. This phobia has played out in presidential decisions up through the present. The
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phobia has prevented military intervention in locations such as Rwanda, the Congo, and
Sudan.74
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Conclusion
The years covered in this thesis were of momentous upheaval in history. They
included years of race riots brought on by the civil rights movement, international unrest
caused by the Vietnam War, and a gender movement that spurred from women wanting
more independence. Together, each of these movements contributed to a time of tension
and societal disconnects which were reflected in the presidential elections of 1964 and
1972. I will first determine if these two presidential elections can be considered
watershed elections in their own way or if they were merely landslide elections. I will
then further examine the immediate and long term implications of these trends. In doing
this, I will analyze how these two elections contributed to the eventual election of
President Reagan and a more general move toward conservative politics. Due to the fact
that the Watergate scandal lies beyond 1972 it will not be considered as a factor.
Congressional Quarterly defines a watershed election as any election that serves
as a “crucial turning point in American political history”.75 By this definition, scholars
agree there have only been four watershed elections in history. They occurred in 1800,
1828, 1860, 1896, and 1932.76 A more common occurrence is a landslide election. This
term indicated that the candidate won with at least 60 percent of the popular vote and 80
or 90 percent of the Electoral College vote. Using this definition there have been four
landslide elections between 1824 and 1996, they occurred in 1936, 1964, 1972, and
1984.77 Instead of these elections demonstrating a continuous change in voting behavior
or of political alignment, three out of four of these elections resulted in the immediate, or
75

Congressional Quarterly, Political Parties in America (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Quarterly Press, 2001), 116.
76
Ibid., 116.
77
Ibid., 120.

50

very quick, reversal of presidential party in the white house. Therefore, landslide
elections can be considered as possibly having a long term effect on political alignment,
but more importantly, are typically indicative of an immediate reversal.
The 1964 election can only be viewed as a watershed election in terms of how
presidential campaigns from this point on would treat race. Jeremy Mayer, in his book
Running on Race classifies the 1964 as the only racial watershed election to ever take
place.78 He claims that the election was a decisive time in which the Republican and
Democratic parties were forced to take a stance on racial issues. These stances have
maintained themselves since this election, meaning that they were a crucial turning point
in racial political history. The way in which race was handled in 1964 and 1968 allowed
for a permanent change in regional voting patterns. These elections allowed for the
solidified the allegiance of the southern black vote to the Democratic Party for years to
come. The elections also balanced this out with gaining the support of southern whites for
the Republican Party. Bringing in trends of voter turnout based on race allows one to
conclude that the south will continue to be majority Republican because whites vote at a
higher rate than any other ethnicity.
Perhaps the largest reason that most scholars refuse to claim the 1964 election as a
watershed is the notion Johnson was immediately followed by a Republican, which is not
indicative of a permanent political shift. This sole factor allows scholars to conclude that
this was a landslide election but not a watershed. In fact, Johnson won the presidential
election by gaining the largest percentage of the popular vote that any president has ever
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acquired.79 Demonstrative of the party’s disapproval of Johnson by the end of his term,
mainly due to his perceived failure with Vietnam, was the rising of a potential
presidential challenger from within his own party. Once word was released that Johnson
would be challenged by Humphrey he announced he would not seek a second term in
office.
The 1972 election came closer to becoming a watershed election. Nixon had
proved his worth by winning in 1968 in a close presidential race. His popularity
skyrocketed from this point until his landslide reelection in 1972. Most scholars do not
view the 1972 election as a watershed election due to the fact that within two years the
Watergate scandal had come to the forefront of national politics and Nixon was forced to
resign. However, Nixon’s election in 1968 and landslide reelection in 1972 were the
beginning of an overarching change in the political identity of the United States. Aside
from gaining new support from the Democrats, Nixon was able to win over the vast
majority of the 13.6 percent of the population that had voted for the third candidate,
Wallace, in the 1968 election.80 This 13.6 percent could have gone to either party directly
after the 1968 election. It was this swing group that helped to make Nixon’s second
election a landslide election. Although Nixon was followed by a Democrat, one can only
assume that it is natural for a nation to immediately move away from the party that
caused a scandal such as Watergate. The movement toward the right is then continued
with Reagan twice followed by Bush senior.
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It was over 20 years from the time that Nixon was first elected that a Democratic
president would be elected again for more than one term. It was Bill Clinton who was
elected as president in 1992 and again in 1996 and then immediately followed by a
Republican. David G. Lawrence, in his book The Collapse of the Democratic
Presidential Majority, found a new way to show the Democrats’ decline in presidential
influence. He found that if elections since the Depression are broken up into different
groups, 1932-1948, 1952-1968, and 1972-1988 there is a fall in the percentage of popular
vote received from 55.2 to 48 to an ultimate low of 43 percent in the last grouping.81
Johnson was the only president who gained more than these averages. The support for the
Democratic Party was even less than these percentages in the elections of Eisenhower
and Reagan. The graph below depicts this shift and shows the overall diminishing support
for the Democratic Party.
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The shift away from the Democratic Party is also evident by examining how close
or far voters perceive themselves and the opposing party affiliates from their parties. By
looking at both conservative, liberal, and centrists from both parties in 1972 and 1984 it
becomes clear that conservative Republicans and centrist Republicans feel closer aligned
on the issues with their party than all Democrats do. In 1972 when Democrats were asked
how close they were to their party on the issues they perceived themselves as being only
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.09 more to the left than their party while they thought Republicans were .13 more to the
right. When Republicans were asked the same question, they saw themselves as being
more liberal and to the left than the party and perceived Democrats to be an astronomical
.27 points more liberal than the party. Further, when centrists from each party were asked
the same questions, Democrats saw Republicans as being closer in ideological alignment
with their party, being only slightly more conservative than the Democratic Party.
Democrats saw themselves as being far removed from their party and centrist
Republicans viewed this gap to be even larger. This explanation is depicted in the graphs
below to demonstrate the identity gap between party affiliates and overall party action. It
can be concluded from the 1972 study that Democrats, especially centrist Democrats had
a great reason to shift away from their candidate and vote Republican. They essentially
saw themselves as being closer aligned to the Republican Party than to their own. This
was statistically the case for centrist Democrats and general Democrats saw themselves to
far removed, ideologically, from their own party that they had little reason to maintain
allegiance.
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The 1984 election, as shown below, also indicates a further shift to the right of
Republicans. The study was only asked of the centrists of both parties in 1984 and for the
first time in several years, centrist Democrats saw themselves as closer in identification to
their own party than to that of the opposition. Democrats perceived themselves as closer
84

"Perceived Distance for Centrist Partisans: 1972," chart, in The Collapse of the Democratic
Presidential Majority, by David G. Lawrence (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), 91.
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to the center than Republicans. Taking into account this change in political affiliation, it
is evident that Reagan did not win based on an overall shift toward the right. It is
otherwise suggested that the 1980 victory was caused by Carter himself. In other words,
it was not necessarily Reagan who won the election, but rather Carter who lost. Reagan
was then able to accomplish great economic success within his last two years of his first
term which ultimately led to his landslide election in 1984. Although this economic
success came at a later price, it moved the image of the Republican Party further to the
right where it has since remained.85

85

Ibid, 165.
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86

New issues have emerged in the political spectrum since the 1984 election and
they cut across the party cleavage. Two of these main issues are race and foreign
relations. An NES survey concluded that Democrats are perceived to be better at handling
race and civil issues while Republicans are perceived to be better at handling foreign
relations issues.87 This has resulted in the general population becoming less party
affiliated. Instead of a realignment taking place throughout the nation, researchers are
referring to the movement as a de-alignment.88 In other words, the general population is
moving away from traditional party values because the big issues have changed.
It can therefore, be concluded from this study that the direct cause of the partisan
shift that took place between 1964 and 1972 is due to a combination of race, gender,
American casualty count, and several other factors. The implication of this shift has been
long lasting and clearly indicates either realignment or at least a de-alignment of the
general population and the two party system. The future is the only definite indicator of
these permanent party shifts.
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